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PANEL DISCUSSION:
THE FEDERAL PROSECUTOR'S ROLE
IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS
MODERATOR

Charles M. Carberry*

PANELISTS

Honorable John S. Martin, Jr.**
Robert B. Fiske, Jr.***
Mary Ellen Krist
Ronald K. Noblett
Honorable Jed S. Rakoffttt
Mary Spearing*
MR. CARBERRY: Good afternoon. This panel is on "The Federal Prosecutor's Role in the Regulatory Process." Federal prosecutors have the ability to prosecute federal crimes. As you know,
there are thousands of federal crimes.1 Federal prosecutors work
closely in some instances with regulators and the types of prosecutions they elect to bring are coordinated with regulators. In other
areas, there is no coordination and it is basically left to the individual Assistant or to an individual U.S. Attorney's Office to determine how to proceed in the courts criminally, what regulatory
scheme to operate under, or what resources to bring to bear.
One of the tensions in any prosecutor's office is the tension between the need to address severe crimes immediately, the street
crimes that affect people's quality of life, and the desire to enhance
* Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue; Adjunct Professor, Fordham University
School of Law.
** United States District Judge, Southern District of New York.
*** Partner, Davis, Polk & Wardwell.
I Regional Director, New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation.
tt Professor, New York University School of Law.
itt United States District Judge, Southern District of New York.
f Partner, Baker & Botts.
1. See Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43 SYRACUSE

L. REV. 681 (1992) (explaining how the Judicial Conference has sought to influ-

ence the "federalizing" of criminal offenses); Sam J. Ervin, III, The Federalizationof
State Crimes: Some Observationsand Reflections, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 761, 762 (1996)

(same).
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other areas of federal law enforcement of federal, civil, or administrative concern. One of the things that becomes unique in federal
criminal law enforcement is the sometimes triple layers of attack
that the government will direct at a particular problem. It will be
both administrative and civil on one side, and criminal on the
other.
We have a very distinguished and experienced panel to discuss
this. John Martin, who is a District Judge for the Southern District
of New York and a former U.S. Attorney, is seated to my left.
Next to John is Bob Fiske. Bob was a U.S. Attorney in the
Southern District of New York. He has held other government positions, and he is, as was John, a very effective, skillful and experienced defense attorney.
To my immediate right is Ron Noble. Ron is currently teaching
at New York University School of Law. He was the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement. He had a stint as the Chief
of Staff in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice
("Department" or "DOJ"), and he also was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia.
To my left is Mary Ellen Kris. Mary Ellen is a graduate of Fordham Law School. She was an Assistant United States Attorney in
both the Criminal and Civil Division, emphasizing environmental
cases, she was an environmental civil and criminal defense attorney, and currently Mary Ellen is Regional Director for the New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation. She has
the important region, New York City.
Next to Ron is Jed Rakoff. Jed is a District Judge in the Southern District of New York. He was a very experienced defense attorney. He is one of the authors of a treatise on corporate crime.2
He was also the Chief of the Business Crimes Unit in the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New York.
To Jed's right is Mary Spearing. Mary is also a graduate of Fordham Law School. She was most recently the Chief of the Fraud
Section of the Department of Justice. She also had been Chief of
the General Litigation Section in the Department of Justice and
she also had been an Assistant United States Attorney in Philadelphia. Mary is currently a member of the firm of Baker & Botts.
I am going to ask this first question to Mary because Mary is
most recently in the government. Given the many demands on the
government, Mary, how do you make the decision to prosecute
2. See JED S. RAKOFF ET AL., CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
ANCE AND MITIGATION (1993 & Supp. 1998).
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someone or undertake an investigation at the request of a regulatory agency for a regulatory violation?
MS. SPEARING: I think that what amazed me when I was
Chief of the Fraud Section is how timid a lot of agencies were. I
think that the squeaky wheel really does get the grease. The most
aggressive agencies who demanded our attention with serious cases
got serious attention.
I saw over and over again that we would have to reach out to a
number of agencies to actually tell them that we wanted to focus
on their regulatory scheme or their enforcement efforts. We would
do that in a number of cases.
In a number of cases, it was driven by the Attorney General's
priorities. Very often, she would direct that we meet with an
agency and talk about what enforcement efforts they were making.
But most of the time, I have to say that we were in a responsive
mode at the Fraud Section.
MR. CARBERRY: Mary Ellen, as a regulator, what is the place
of the criminal enforcement of the regulative statutes?
MS. KRIS: I can answer on my own personal views. When I was
still with the U.S. Attorney's Office, there was a real interest on the
part of management to do environmental cases, and we never
could seem to get the quality case we were looking for from the
regulatory agencies. As a prosecuting office at the time, I felt we
wanted to set an agenda and felt that the regulatory agencies were
an impediment.
Now that I am on the other side of the street and I am the regulator, I actually have referred some cases out for prosecution. My
orientation is quite different now than it was as a prosecutor.
I feel that the regulatory agency is uniquely qualified to establish
its own priorities and policies. One of the things that is challenging
about this area of the law is that the regulatory agency which perhaps, by orientation, does not view enforcement the same way a
prosecutor's office does, must translate its needs and policies to the
prosecuting office. Sometimes that which maybe makes the best
prosecution of a particular environmental crime may not actually
make the best policy in terms of what you want to achieve for the
environment.
So I think that, in the environmental arena in particular, doing
quality referrals and investigations and prosecutions requires phenomenal cooperation and teamwork, above and beyond that which
is essential for any good interface between an enforcement office
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and a regulatory office. It also raises, I think, some fairly unique
parallel proceedings questions.
My perspective is that it is difficult. From a regulatory standpoint, my pitch is that to do this really well requires real teamwork
and a respect for the regulatory mission of the agency which the
prosecuting office is serving and working with.
MR. CARBERRY: What types of cases would you want to involve the criminal process in?
MS. KRIS: Essentially, in the environmental area, for the most
part, I think it is appropriate - it is common sense - to go to
those situations where you believe there was intentional misconduct or a pattern of misconduct, such that it is really flagrant; it is
not just bad judgment or a mistake, but maybe more a systemic
issue with respect to an individual or an organization.
It seems to me that using criminal enforcement, in addition to
the other regulatory administrative and civil tools that exist, is appropriate when you have a broad, systemic problem that you are
trying to address, whether with just that actor or in a particular
area of environmental law where we are trying to deter others.
MR. CARBERRY: Jed, do you have something to add?
JUDGE RAKOFF: Yes. I passed Charlie a note because I was
thinking about Bill Tendy, whom this program is rightly devoted to
because he was a very great man and a very great public servant. If
Bill were asked about the topic here, and what Mary Ellen was just
addressing, "what is the role of a federal criminal prosecutor in the
regulatory process," I am very confident that if Bill Tendy were
here, he would say "none." The reason he would say none I think
maybe needs to be put on the table for discussion.
The traditional prosecutor, A la Bill Tendy, viewed his role as
basically a champion of morality, of right over wrong, and viewed
the criminal law, I think with perhaps good reason, as basically directed to the affirmation of the moral law where it has been severely infringed. In the white-collar business crime area, that
means fraud and lying - both of which are readily within the purview of very traditional federal criminal statutes, like the mail
fraud statute3 and the statute against fraud and false statements.4
The regulatory process looks at the criminal law differently. It
looks at the criminal law as an instrument of social policy and invokes academia, invokes all the kinds of ideas that became current
beginning with the New Deal, and inevitably focuses, I think, more
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1984 & Supp. 1998).
4. See id. § 1001.
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on the effects of the actions that are being looked at than on the
intentions of the persons who are the actors.
If Bill Tendy were here, I think he would say that was a dreadful
mistake, and that social policy ought to be left largely to economic
deterrence outside the criminal process, and that jail and prison
ought to be reserved for people who are evil people, to use a very
old-fashioned, non-legalistic term.
MR. CARBERRY: I believe there has been a division between
people who view law enforcement, as stated in the criminal codes,
as a reflection of formal moral standards, and people who have
viewed law enforcement basically as enforcement of regulations
and statutes passed by Congress, which may not be malum prohibitum crimes, 5 but malum in se crimes,6 as we know them in common law.
But, Ron, when you were in Treasury, you were in an agency
that had both civil and criminal functions; you had two divisions,
Customs and the Internal Revenue Service, which have both civil
and criminal jurisdictions. How do you make your decisions on
how to proceed, how to divide the resources, and what types of
crimes you are going to bring in those areas?
PROF. NOBLE: I want to respond to that question, but also can
I say something controversial? I want to take a different position.
I want to submit that it is important to have regulatory rules and
regulatory options to keep our law enforcement officers safe and to
keep our citizens safe.
What I want to do is draw your attention to Waco as an example.
In Waco, we had an agency that armed to the teeth because they
knew that the people inside of the compound had machine guns.7
Our criminal law said that if you have machine guns, you are engaged in serious criminal violations and your criminal exposure is
therefore very high.
Now, I think, when we have laws saying that it is unlawful to
possess, for example, machine guns, the reason we have those laws
is not because it is evil in and of itself to own machine guns; it is a
malum prohibitum crime, not a malum in se crime. Why? Because
5. "A wrong prohibited; a thing which is wrong because prohibited; an act which
is not inherently immoral, but becomes so because its commission is expressly forbidden by positive law." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 960 (6th ed. 1990).
6. "A wrong in itself; an act or case involving illegality from the very nature of
the transaction, upon principles of natural, moral, and public law." Id. at 959.
7. See Pierre Thomas, Judgment of ATF in Raid on Cult at Waco is Faulted,
WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1993, at A8.
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we are afraid they are going to do something evil with those
machine guns.
So, as a society, if we had a regulatory framework, a civil enforcement framework, that said "Our goal as law enforcers should
be to get these dangerous machine guns off the streets," then our
mindset as prosecutors and as agents would be different. For example, if we had a drug bust that we were trying to make and we
got into the apartment, and before we could make the arrest the
drugs were flushed down the toilet and there was no evidence of
the drugs, we would say, "My God, that is a failure. We failed an
opportunity to arrest otherwise culpable people."
If we use the same analogy with machine guns, if we were to say,
"Before we got in there, they melted all the machine guns, they
melted all the assault weapons," we would also, under the current
framework, consider that a failure because there is only a criminal
law enforcement scheme.
So my view is that we need to have a mixture of civil enforcement options, regulatory options, and criminal options, so that
when a current situation arises, we can decide why Congress passed
this law. We know one reason is to get votes. But another reason
might be to effect some social policy, for example, to have our
streets safer. So I think a mixture of criminal law enforcement and
civil enforcement options is a good thing, not a bad thing.
MR. CARBERRY: But how do you decide which option to
use?
PROF. NOBLE: I would just say it has to be on a case-by-case
basis, and this has a sort of strange outcome. I would approach a
situation like Waco or the Montana Freemen,8 and I would say,
"What is the harm we are trying to address? What is the evidence
we have of that harm? Can we enforce the law without putting our
citizens and our agents at unnecessary risk?" So, for example, if I
know that I cannot get into a facility safely in order to execute the
criminal law, if I know that by putting them on notice, they are
going to destroy their weapons possibly or turn those weapons on
me, one of the things I might do is use a court to get a court order
to say "Comply with X, Y, or Z or you come under the penalty of
some criminal contempt sanction."
Then I do not have to worry about evidence being destroyed and
I have achieved the harm of identifying people, not as being viola8. See A Chronology of the 81-day Siege of the Freemen Compound, NEWS &
(Raleigh, N.C.), June 14, 1996, at Al (providing a day-by-day account of
the standoff).
OBSERVER
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tors of a gun law, because they believe in a Second Amendment
right or because they have some fear of the Federal Government,
but because their fear has been taken to the point of ignoring valid
court orders. I think it has to be done on a case-by-case basis.
That would be my view.
MR. CARBERRY: One of the options the Federal Government
often has is to proceed civilly under criminal statutes, for example,
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
("RICO") statute,9 under the money laundering statute, 10 or under
the injunction against fraud statute."
,Bob, in your experience, how would you make that decision as a
U.S. Attorney? When do you use your civil resources? When do
you use your criminal resources? There is a current memo from
the Attorney General which basically says, "Screw them seven
ways to Sunday, do everything you can. '"12
MR. FISKE: There is one element of the sufficiency of the evidence that might go into that judgment. I can see making the decision that you did not have enough evidence to make it a criminal
case, but that you were willing to proceed civilly. I think that kind
of a situation is going to be relatively rare.
I think my view, as a U.S. Attorney, in almost every case I could
think of, would be to proceed criminally if we had the evidence
that justified it. If there was also a civil remedy, that could be considered in conjunction, if it was appropriate. But I would not have
deferred a valid criminal prosecution to pursue a civil remedy.
MS. SPEARING: Charlie, can I just get back to what Jed said
earlier, and correct me if I am wrong, but it sounded as though
what you were saying was that regulatory violations should never
be criminally prosecuted because we should reserve our criminal
laws for the big bad guys who have formed this bad intent. Are
you saying that there are no violators of regulatory schemes that
are not bad actors?
JUDGE RAKOFF: First of all, of course, I was not expressing
my view. As a federal judge, I have no views. But what I was
putting on the table is the notion that the criminal law should be
9. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1998).
10. See id. § 1956(e).
11. See id. § 1345.
12. See Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum: Coordinate ParallelCriminal, Civil & Administrative, July 28, 1997. It is available online at <http://
www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/970728.htm> (last updated Oct. 30, 1997) [hereinafter
AG Memo].
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reserved for people who have acted with mens rea,'3 and should
not be used as an instrument of social policy because of its unique
deterrent effect. That is a tempting thing to do from a social policy
perspective, but I think its inevitable result is to place in prison
people who did not in their minds and hearts intend to do wrong.
That strikes me as arguably immoral in and of itself.
The issue then becomes, are there regulatory offenses that also
involve mens rea? Yes. But to give you an example of the distinction I am drawing, take the securities fraud area, which is one of
the areas where this has been going on for the longest period of
time. 4 There are intentional acts of fraud of a great variety involving the securities market. They could all, frankly, be prosecuted,
there is really no doubt, under the mail fraud statute. 5 But if
someone wants to bring, as I used to be prone to bringing, prosecutions under Rule 10b-516 instead, no harm, no foul.
But there are also all sorts of rule offenses, rules that the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has promulgated,17 far
more technical rules that, on paper, could be the subject of criminal
prosection. I am just raising the question whether criminal prosecution is the appropriate route to go in those cases.
It is not that prosecutors do not have the power. It is right there.
Congress gave it. But if in fact what those folks were doing was a
sophisticated form of thievery, then they ought to be prosecuted
for that under the fraud statutes. If, instead, they were breaking,
perhaps unknowingly, or certainly not with bad intent, some rules
that exist primarily to promote the efficiency of the marketplace, I
am raising the question of whether things like the efficiency of the
marketplace could be better and more appropriately dealt with
through economic civil sanctions than through criminal sanctions.
JUDGE MARTIN: Can I add a footnote to that? I think that
part of the problem that Jed addressed raises another issue, and

13. "As an element of criminal responsibility: a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful
purpose; a criminal intent. Guilty knowledge and wilfulness." BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY

985 (6th ed. 1990).

14. See Paul H. Dawes, The Mens Requirement for Criminal Liability under Sec-

tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, in

SECURITIES LITIGATION

515, at 519 (PLI Corp. L. &

Prac. Course Handbook Series No. BO-0033, Sept.-Oct. 1998) (examining the new issues of mens rea of insider trading for corporate entities).
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1984 & Supp. 1998).
16. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).

17. See id. §§ 201-301.
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that is the fair notice element that is part of due process.18 When
you have so many regulatory schemes that carry criminal penalties
and they are not being enforced on the criminal side, then all of a
sudden you come down on some area of regulatory law, making it
criminal because the statute has been there. You sweep into the
criminal process people who had no idea that they were ever subjecting themselves to criminal liability. I think that when you are
talking about something that is basically malum prohibitum, that is
tremendously unfair, even though you can say in an over-arching
sense they had notice because the statute was on the books.
In real life - I have seen this, and I think any of us who have
done criminal defense work have seen it - I have seen instances
where people were engaged in a certain type of conduct, and all of
a sudden they found themselves being prosecuted for something
they never realized was criminal.
MR. CARBERRY: But if the statute is on the books and you
are a federal prosecutor sworn to uphold the law and a regulatory
agency wants to bring a proceeding, who is going to make the decision as to what to do? We all understand Jed's point, which is
"Fraud is fraud, it does not really matter what scheme it is in,"
although the question of when does conflict of interest become
fraud leads to the notice question; and secondly, if you lie to the
agencies, it is wrong, and you should not be obstructing their investigatory process. But beyond those two standards, who makes the
decision?
JUDGE MARTIN: Part of the problem is you really have a balkanization of the prosecutorial decision-making process. I think
one of the things that I found most difficult, and that Bob did too,
is when you have agencies of limited jurisdiction and they have
found a criminal violation, something that you would not as a prosecutor in any other context prosecute, they would bang your head
to try and get prosecuted some violation of their regulation. So it
changes the whole perception of what is important in law
enforcement.
It is very hard when you have an agency that has devoted its time
to a case and investigated it for a long time, but you say, "On a
normal scale of prosecutorial discretion, this is not something I
would prosecute."
18. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) ("[I]t is reasonable that a
fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will
understand, or what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.").
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MR. CARBERRY: .But in most of those instances, the agents
would come in and be dealing with junior prosecutors; it would not
reach the level of the, U.S. Attorney. So do junior prosecutors have
discretion not to proceed? Who is making the decision?
JUDGE MARTIN: I think they would come to the U.S. Attorney. Sure, they are at the junior prosecutor level, but most of these
regulatory violations involve defendants, usually with some money,
and they get the "Gerard Lynches" and the people who know the
system, and it does ultimately work its way up to the U.S. Attorney, who, if the U.S. Attorney declines, then the agency lawyers
are saying, "It is just the 'old-boy-network' at work."
MR. FISKE: I think that if an agency brought a case to an Assistant and the Assistant declined it because, even though it might be
a crime, the Assistant did not think it was a crime that deserved to
be prosecuted, the agency, if they cared about it, would take that
decision up the line right to the U.S. Attorney.
I think there is a very important reason for a dialogue at that
point between the U.S. Attorney and the agency to try to make a
judgment as to whether, in this particular situation, a criminal prosecution would have a significant deterrent effect that would enhance the goals and objectives of the agency in a meaningful way. I
think that is a factor that the U.S. Attorney should take into consideration in a major way.
MR. CARBERRY: Bob, you had the reverse situation in a case
that is reported in the Second Circuit, where the U.S. Attorney
determined that it was a violation of the regulatory scheme and the
regulator saying no, it was not, and the U.S. Attorney proceeded
with the criminal prosecution. 19
MR. FISKE: That is an example of the U.S. Attorney proceeding -

this is unusual, I think -

to make something criminal that

even the agency is not suggesting is a violation, and the result can
be a very negative result for the enforcement efforts of the agency.
This was a prosecution of the chief financial officer of Southland
Corporation, a man named Clark Matthews, in the Eastern District
fourteen or fifteen years ago. ° Count one charged Mr. Matthews
with a conspiracy to bribe the state tax commission to get favorable
19. See United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that at least
so long as uncharged criminal conduct is not required to be disclosed by any rule
lawfully promulgated by the SEC, nondisclosure of such conduct cannot be the basis
of a criminal prosecution).
20. See United States v. Dole, 601 F.Supp. 430, 431 (1984) (denying motions of
dismissal for defendants Dole and Matthews).
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tax treatment for Southland.2 1 That conspiracy, quite arguably,
was barred by the statute of limitations,22 and indeed the jury acquitted on that count.2 3
Three years after that statute had expired, but two years before
the prosecution, Mr. Matthews ran for reelection to the Board of
Directors of Southland. The second count charged that it was a
criminal violation of the proxy rules for Mr. Matthews not to have
disclosed to the stockholders who were voting for his reelection
that he had participated in this alleged crime to bribe the state tax
officials.24
Ira L. Sorkin, who was then the Regional Administrator of the
SEC, spoke out publicly after this case was brought and said he
disagreed with this theory.2 5 Judge Sifton allowed it to go to the
jury and the jury convicted Mr. Matthews. 26 The Second Circuit
reversed and said that the proxy rules only required a disclosure of
actual criminal convictions, and it was far too vague, far too fuzzy,
far too illusory, to try to inject qualitative judgments as to what did
or did not reflect on someone's integrity and then make that a requirement for disclosure with a penalty of criminal prosecution if it
was not disclosed.2 7
I think the opinion made sense to most people. I believe that the
SEC would never have brought that case, even civilly.
MR. CARBERRY: In some areas of the law, tax being the major example, the Department of Justice cannot recommend criminal prosecution without Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
approval, and the Department has centralized review to have uniform approval of the tax system. In other areas, like securities,
there are no restrictions. Ron, why is that?
PROF. NOBLE: In ten words or less, right? Just to be clear - I
was never in charge of the IRS.
I think this ties into Judge Martin's comment. I believe that the
reason why the IRS is able to create tremendous transactional
costs before a criminal tax prosecution is brought is because the
21. See id.
22. See id. at 432.
23. See Matthews, 787 F.2d at 39.
24. See Dole, 601 F.Supp. at 431.
25. See Charles W. Stevens, Southland Officials' Trial May Result in New Applications of Securities Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1985 ("I don't know of any other case
where someone is accused of failing to disclose a crime they haven't been convicted of
....
It's a new approach.").
26. See Dole, 601 F.Supp. at 433; Matthews, 787 F.2d at 39.
27. See Matthews, 787 F.2d at 47-48.
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IRS is as big and as powerful as it is, and they have not let go of a
jurisdiction that Main Justice has had in the Tax Division or that
the agency continues to have.
But there are other federal agencies with regulatory responsibilities that have criminal penalties and find themselves going to U.S
Attorneys with violations that seem important to those agencies.
But in the mix of cases and offices, like the Southern District of
New York, and sometimes the small offices like the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, they do not seem to be important cases.
One of the questions that I have had all along is whether the
policy should be made bottom-up, with an aggressive special agent
in charge of that agency, or an aggressive agency head, or an aggressive Cabinet-level officer going over to the Justice Department
and persuading prosecutors to prosecute that case, or whether the
policy should be formulated at the top and trickle down to the
bottom.
My view, having spent a number of years in Washington, is the
better course is for it to be bottom-up as opposed to top-down.
MR. CARBERRY: Why is that?
PROF. NOBLE: Washington.
MS. SPEARING: Charlie, I think that you raised a very good
question, which is, why is the decision of whether to bring the case
made in Washington in a very centralized kind of system, whether
it is antitrust, or tax, or to some extent the Environmental
Division?
With respect to all other offenses, including some regulatory offenses, it is made "out in the field," as we say in Washington. I do
not think there is a rational, articulable reason as to why that distinction exists.
I think that, to the extent that U.S. Attorneys start wanting to do
antitrust cases themselves, Justice will cede control of that, the way
they have ceded control of the Environmental Division powers.
It seems to me that the decision whether to prosecute a securities
fraud case is made in the district in which it is brought, but an environmental case has to go through the Environmental Division at
Main Justice, developed over time and there really is no basis for it
anymore.
MR. CARBERRY: Partly, at least historically, the explanation
has always been that these are difficult areas requiring some sort of
agency expertise in evaluating the case, and that these are areas
where having national standards of law enforcement is important.
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But now some Assistants decide whether or not a particular criminal statute is going to be enforced in their districts.
MS. KRIS: So what you have is a uniform standard of enforcement in certain divisions and not a uniform standard in other
divisions.
MR. CARBERRY: Right. So if the criminal law process is now
an important part of the regulatory process, despite Jed's eloquent
objections, what is rational about it?
MS. SPEARING: I do not think you can centralize everything
in a department or it will come to a grinding halt.
MR. CARBERRY: But wouldn't that be beneficial?
MS. SPEARING: Now I think so. But, as I was saying to you at
lunch - and I know you do not want to talk about anything except
regulatory crimes - I think a more troubling question is if you
commit a million-dollar bank fraud in Los Angeles, there may be a
decision not to prosecute because of resources and their threshold
intake level requirements. But if you commit the exact same federal crime in Raleigh, North Carolina, you will be in jail for years
and your name will be on the front page of the paper. So to me,
the disparity in enforcement is with respect to all federal crimes,
not just regulatory crimes.
MR. CARBERRY: But Los Angeles has a cutoff on bank fraud.
Each office has a policy on cutoffs. But you still have people doing
other cases. If you have a million-dollar cutoff on bank fraud and
you have an Assistant prosecuting a $14,000 insider trading case,
what is the point?
There are no uniform standards, for example, when an SEC insider trading case will become a criminal case, other than, as Bob
pointed out, on the evaluation of the evidence. After that, it is
really just hit or miss.
Is that a rational system? And, as this system increases, is this a
system that is going to go forward? John, you have much more
experience in this.
JUDGE MARTIN: Congress has put some criminal statutes on
the books because people in some part of the country think that it
was important. And I think there is something to be said for that.
It is simply true that local problems are different. For example,
stealing a horse in Montana probably is a more serious offense
than stealing a horse in New York. So the things that may be inconsequential to a New York prosecutor represent something that
the prosecutors in another jurisdiction feel is important.
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. I do not think uniformity across the country is good. Indeed, the
Sentencing Guidelines prove that when we try to get uniformity we
do not necessarily advance the system of justice. 28 That is why you
have presidential appointees serving as U.S. Attorneys. Each is
supposed to be exercising independent judgment as to what is important in his or her district.
JUDGE RAKOFF: Charlie, I would like to call attention to the
difference between consistency resulting from oversight and rules
- which, as Judge Martin points out, in the case of the Sentencing
Guidelines has not worked well, and I do not think has worked
well internally when it is a question of the multiple rules issuing out
of Washington on tax cases or environmental cases or fraud cases.
But I would distinguish that from centralized review. I think
there is a great benefit in having some option to have national or
disinterested review of decisions that are taken by a local U.S. Attorney. The concomitant of being able to exercise good judgment
because you are right there on the spot and can see all the nittygritty things that are going on, is that sometimes you lose perspective on the broader national priorities and the broader picture.
I would suggest, if you wanted to ask the question, "What is a
rational or most efficient approach?," I think the answer would be
primary decision-making at the local level with very few actual
rules, such as cutoffs for a million-dollar bank robbery or anything
like that, but a reasonable opportunity for review at the national
level as an option that counsel can pursue.
MR. FISKE: If I can just follow up on that, I think there clearly
are some situations where, just from a law enforcement point of
view, it is good to have centralized review. For example, take the
RICO statute.29 Particularly when that first came in, nobody really
knew what it meant, nobody knew how far it should reach. The
same thing was true with the money laundering statute. 30 And you
could have people out in the field going off in a half-cocked direction and then getting a bad decision from a district judge that could
be a setback to the overall national enforcement program.
28. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL (1998); see also Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing
Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1027, 1029 (1997) (referring to the discretion exercised by the prosecution and the
judge in arriving at downward departures for substantial assistance pursuant to
Guideline § 5K1.1.).
29. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1998).
30. See id. § 1956.
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So I think there are situations like that where there is a legitimate need for review, just in terms of having a national policy asto
whether this is the kind of conduct that the government wants to
prosecute under this particular statute. But I think those kind of
situations are relatively limited.
MR. CARBERRY: What about the situation, which is more and
more common now because of aggressive enforcement in civil divisions, of parallel criminal and civil proceedings, where in the settlement of the case the criminal penalties or the criminal charges will
be lessened greatly by more money forked over in the civil
settlement?
Mary, your department, the Fraud Section, was sort of on the
cutting edge of using criminal statutes as extortion for a few years.
Maybe you would like to say something about that.
MS. SPEARING: That was during the defense procurement
fraud crisis, and I was not the extorter then.
I just want to comment also. You are referring to this memo
from the Attorney General as though this was a new thing. That
memo was a reiteration of a memo that Edwin Meese 31 had issued
in 1986.32 The current Attorney General's Council on White-Collar Crime 33 thought it was time to dust it off and send it out again,
because the law enforcement agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), were resisting doing investigations if
all they were going to get was a civil resolution. So that message
that went out from the Attorney General, to pursue all avenues, is
not a new message.
MR. CARBERRY: No, it is a "Meese" message.
31. United States Attorney General, 1985-88.
32. See Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum: Coordination of Criminal
& Civil Fraud, Waste & Abuse Proceedings,July 16, 1986, cited in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 4-4.1100 (Aspen Law 1987).
33. Testimony Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the
Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies,
105th Cong. (May 1, 1996) (statement of John C. Keeney, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division).
The Attorney General's Council on White-Collar Crime, which the Criminal
Division chairs, is responsible for identifying emerging trends in white-collar
crime and in developing strategies and cooperative initiatives to respond to
such crimes. The role and efforts of the Council on White-Collar Crime are
augmented by the interagency coordination and initiative 'working groups'
on bank fraud, health care provider fraud, telemarketing fraud, insurance
fraud, and computer crime. These groups have proved to be particularly
successful vehicles for fostering effective multi-agency investigations and
prosecutions of economic crimes.
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MS. SPEARING: I forgot what your question is, but something
about extortion. I do not think it is extortion for the Civil Division
to be pursuing a civil settlement with a health care company that
we are also investigating criminally. I think that, frankly, the accomplishments in that area and others have been phenomenal for
the Department of Justice.
MS. KRIS: May I interject, Charlie? I want to add a slightly
different angle on that. I think that the message in Attorney General Reno's memo about assessing the value of having combined
civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement to get your maximum result is a wonderful goal. The reality is that it is so difficult
to balance the competing issues, and the risk is that there can be
much unfairness visited on individuals and companies.
What I saw in private practice was that the greater problem for
my clients was not the use of criminal prosecution to extort a civil
result, but using administrative powers, particularly suspension and
debarment, as a club to force a criminal disposition in a case that
never would have resulted in a criminal disposition in a million
years.
So again, I think that when you are talking about enforcement in
an area that stems from regulations, statutes, and policies, I think
that it presents challenges and stresses that already exist in the system and puts greater emphasis on the integrity and the balance and
the judgment of the people exercising the discretion.
That does not mean it should not be done. I do agree with Judge
Rakoff that Bill Tendy would never have applauded the criminalization of non-criminal regulations for the sake of changing the
industry.
On the other hand, because it is harder does not mean it should
not be done, because it is harder perhaps to understand the underlying policy than it might be. To take Ron's earlier example, when
you think about it, the issue is we want to get the guns off the
street. Well, many times in a regulatory arena there is a comparable public health and safety issue, though it may not leap off the
page to a particular prosecutor or an individual.
But what all that* means is all the important issues we have
talked about today, in terms of federalism or centralization or
training, when all is said and done, the system only works when
there are checks and balances and fairness and integrity. It is particularly challenging, I think, in the regulatory area.
JUDGE MARTIN: I also think that insider trading cases exemplify part of the way to move from the civil into the criminal side of
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regulatory enforcement. 34 That is an area where, I think, it started
out with most people on Wall Street not thinking of it as being
criminal.35
But I think that the cases we brought - it started with Bob and
continued thereafter - really were all cases where on the facts of
the case there was ample evidence that the people who were involved were using means to hide their activities that clearly manifested that they were engaged in conduct that they thought was
fraudulent.36 By bringing those cases in that area, you build up
public notice that this in fact is criminal conduct.
I have said to defendants when sentencing today, "I just cannot
believe that people are still engaged in insider trading. There was a
time when people could reasonably say they did not understand it
was criminal. Now, today, you are engaging in it. It is clearly 'you
are doing the crime, you do the time,' because you had ample notice that this is criminal." I think you can say that now.
PROF. NOBLE: I would like to follow up on Bob Fiske's point.
Why should the presumption be that if someone brings a case to
you that could be satisfied civilly or criminally, and you have the
evidence to go either way, that one must always go criminally?
That is, if I understood you correctly, you said if the evidence is
there to prosecute it criminally, why not prosecute it criminally.
Why shouldn't the presumption be that we can resolve this case
however we want to resolve it, depending upon the case, but there
is no presumption that if we have evidence to take it criminally, we
are going to take it criminally?
MR. FISKE: I am just trying to think of a case in four years,
where I think virtually every case we prosecuted could have been
34. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 19 (2d. Cir 1981) (reversing
the district court's dismissal of the securities fraud charge because it concluded that
there was no "clear and definite statement" in the federal securities laws which both
antedated and proscribed the acts alleged in (the) indictment" so as to give the defendant a reasonable opportunity to know that his conduct was prohibited), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983), overruled in partby United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997).
35. See Warning Anew on Insider Trading, Bus. WK., July 21, 1980, at 168 ("This
sort of thing [i.e., trading on inside information] happens every day.").
36. See S.E.C. v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 81 (2d. Cir. 1991) (affirming plan of recovery
and conviction of an analyst in the mergers and acquisitions department of Morgan

Stanley & Co., Inc., with providing material, nonpublic information about actual or
contemplated tender offers, mergers or other extraordinary business transactions acquired in confidence during defendant's employment); Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Morgan
Analyst is Sentenced to 3-Year Prison Term, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1988, at D7 (reporting sentencing of defendant Wang for an insider trading scheme that involved at least
two other people).
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brought civilly in one way or another. Maybe we were missing
something, but I do not remember getting into a lot of long discussions about "Why shouldn't we go civil with this?"
PROF. NOBLE: But that just might reflect the mindset of a certain U.S. Attorney's Office.
MR. FISKE: Yes. It probably did.
JUDGE MARTIN: I followed Bob, and I looked at all those
cases. They were right when he brought them.
MR. FISKE: I think what I was really trying to say is that the
principle reason for criminal prosecution is deterrence. Whether it
is successful in the end, people can debate, but that is the rationale
for it. You are trying to deter this kind of conduct by other people
in the future.
If you have a choice between indicting somebody and sending
them to jail or suing them and collecting a certain amount of
money, which they may or may not be able to pay, it seems - at
least it seemed to me - that you get a greater law enforcement
deterring effect by prosecuting them and sending them to jail.
PROF. NOBLE: But if you follow that to its logical conclusion,
the U.S. Attorney's Office or a prosecutor would never enter into
an immunity agreement with anyone. That is, at some point you do
a cost/benefit analysis and you say, "This person, though he or she
engaged in criminal conduct, he or she can give us more, so we are
going to go that route versus another route." Why couldn't you
apply the same logic for civil enforcement schemes?
MR. FISKE: Because you are changing, I think, the question a
little bit. The reason people give immunity agreements is not to be
able to bring a civil case, but to be able to bring a criminal case. So
the immunity is simply a step along the way towards a criminal
prosecution with a deterrent objective.
JUDGE MARTIN: I also think when you are looking at
whether to bring a civil or criminal case, what you are looking at is
what is the evidence that the defendant engaged in willful conduct
knowing that he or she was violating the law. For example, in tax
evasion, you could settle every tax evasion case as a civil case; the
defendants would love to just pay the money. But if you are saying
it is important to enforce the law, when you have the evidence that
there is a willful violation, then, you bring it criminally.
JUDGE RAKOFF: When it comes to bringing both, I think
there are a number of problems that are just beginning to surface.
One, of course, is the question of sharing information that comes
through the Grand Jury. The memo - it is a shame Janet Reno is
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not here to defend herself, and I am sure the memo, as Mary points
out, is something that has existed from time immemorial - but the
memo suggests that you can get around that problem by having
more search warrants.37 Well, do we really want to encourage
more searches as a way of going around the Grand Jury disclosure
problem? That seems counter-productive.
Another problem is that the government has somewhat perhaps
had a charmed life when it comes to parallel proceedings, because
rarely have they had to feel the down-side of that. The down-side,
of course, is the defendant who wants to, can use the civil action to
get discovery as to the criminal case. Whenever that is threatened,
or many times when it is threatened, the government will say, "Oh,
sorry about that. We did not really mean to bring the civil action.
Let's put it on hold and stay it while we proceed with the criminal
case."
But at least one thing, it seems to me, that the government ought
to be thinking about is whether there are not considerable strategic
down-sides to bringing parallel proceedings that may yet emerge in
the future, even though they have not emerged in the past.
MR. CARBERRY: What about the unfairness to the individual
under investigation to have to defend himself in a civil proceeding
at the same time that either there is a criminal charge pending or a
criminal investigation ongoing, and he has the constitutional right
not to speak in that proceeding, but an inference could be drawn
against him in the civil proceeding? And yet, the same party is
manipulating both sides. I mean, you have the government controlling the criminal proceeding and the government controlling
the timing and the way the civil proceeding goes.
Is there any restriction at all on subjecting defendants both to
double legal fees and to basically forcing them to assert their privilege so they are at a disadvantage in the civil case?
JUDGE RAKOFF: Well, of course, if you are asking me about
that, until three years ago (when I left private practice), I would
have thought that subjecting someone to double legal fees was
wholly to be encouraged.
Seriously, however, there are several possible responses. To begin with, the problem can be mitigated by protective orders that
can be sought on the civil side barring the government from having
access to the defendant's testimony if he chooses not to invoke the
Fifth.
37. See AG Memo, supra note 12.
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But I think it is reasonably fair to say that if the government
wants to pursue something both civilly and criminally and that imposes, coincidentally, some difficulties on the defendant, he nevertheless committed conduct that raises both civil and criminal
problems and therefore it is fair game.
What I would like to stress, though, is that the opposite should
also come into play, that the government should have to assume
the burdens of going forward both civilly and criminally, and
should not just be able to use this, as you put it, Charlie, as an
extortionate weapon that they can shake at the defendant to force
him to plead guilty or to raise the stakes. If they have a serious
civil lawsuit, fine, they should bring it; but then they should have to
meet the requirements that every other civil litigant would have to
meet, which include reciprocal discovery.
MR. CARBERRY: One of the recent developments certainly in
the government contract area that has even complicated things further for the government has been the qui tam suits,3 8 where indi-

viduals who are knowledgeable about a fraud on the government
can sue on the government's behalf, and the government has time
to either take over the suit or, if the individual proceeds on his
own, the individual gets a certain amount of any proceeds to be
gained.
Mary, how does that complicate your decisions both civilly and
criminally on how to handle matters?
MS. SPEARING: I think that the emergence of the qui tam lawsuits is another wrinkle in this whole parallel proceeding issue. I
think that it really does raise for the Department issues, which
Mary Ellen raised, about the integrity and high ethical standards
for prosecutors, which are particularly paramount in this area, I
think. And it is a very sensitive area.
I think that the Department has realized that they should not
assume that line prosecutors understand all these issues. I know
that we spent a lot of time discussing getting training for line prosecutors all over the country and in Main Justice, because these issues which may seem evident, such as not threatening to bring a
38. "'Qui tam' is abbreviation of Latin phrase 'qui tam pro domino rege quam pro
si ipso in hac parte sequitur' meaning 'Who sues on behalf of the King as well as for
himself.' It is an action brought by an informer, under a statute which establishes a
penalty for the commission or omission of a certain act, and provides that the same
shall be recoverable in a civil action, part of the penalty to go to any person who will
bring such action and the remainder to the state or some other institution. It is called
a 'qui tam action' because the plaintiff states that he sues as well for the state as for
himself." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990).

1999]

PANEL DISCUSSION

criminal case while a civil investigation is going on, are not that
apparent or evident to all line assistants.
It is scary, when you think about it, how many kinds of delicate
issues they are dealing with at one time and how they are communicating with a qui tam relater's39 lawyer or the Civil Division, and
if they know the mine field that exists out there in the way they
pursue discussions with defense counsel and joint meetings and
joint sharing of information.
I guess what concerns me about the whole qui tam area is
whether the qui tam relater's lawyers are going to be driving the
train in terms of enforcement priorities. For example, when the
Civil Division gets hit with thirty-two qui tam lawsuits in the Columbia case,40 they put a ton of resources on that one case, which
may be completely appropriate.
But the point is that when qui tam lawsuits are dumped in the
Department's lap, the Civil Division has to respond, and the Criminal Division has to respond.
What concerns me is not so much the Department making the
right decision - because I think ultimately, after investigating the
case, they often do not join the qui tam suit, they make the right
decision - but what concerns me is the resources and the enforcement priorities being set, or perhaps being set, by the private bar.
MR. CARBERRY: What about the dealings? This has not
come up yet. But stepping back from qui tam now, as corporate
crimes become more and more targets of investigations, there is an
interaction sometimes between people who have a financial interest in a government action of some kind against a corporation and
in their own private actions.
Are there standards that prosecutors have, written standards in
the Department, on what they should do in terms of relationships
with private attorneys when they have a financial interest in the
outcome of a particular government case?
39. "Qui tam plaintiffs are also frequently referred to as 'informers' or 'relators."'
Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionalityof Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J.

341, 341 n.1 (1989) (concluding that the authorization of qui tam actions remains a
constitutionally acceptable means by which Congress may shape and secure the interests of the United States).
40. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, 125 F.3d 899, 900 (1998) (involving a physician who brought a qui tam action
pursuant to the False Claims Act against a healthcare provider and affiliated entities,
alleging they submitted Medicare claims for services rendered in violation of Medicare anti-kickback statutes and self-referral statutes).
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MS. SPEARING: I do not know that there are written standards that are distributed throughout the Department. I think that
they are cautioned to have very much of an arm's-length relationship with a qui tam relater or a qui tam relater's lawyer. Although
I will say that there is a very wide and differing treatment of qui
tam relaters in the Department, Philadelphia being a prime example of a U.S. Attorney's Office that embraces qui tam relaters in a
way that the rest of the Department is more wary of.
PROF. NOBLE: Philadelphia lawyers are hungrier.
MR. CARBERRY: Mary Ellen, you are a state regulator. How
do you decide if you are going to seek criminal enforcement by
going to state authorities or federal authorities, since you are in the
area of environmental law, which obviously has overlapping
jurisdictions?
MS. KRIS: I would say that, as a general rule, there is probably
a presumption you are going to go to the state because we are all
part of the state. Our lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is
viewed as the Attorney General of the State of New York.
MR. CARBERRY: And who is that?
MS. KRIS: I will let you know in about a week.41 But being a
product of the federal system, I think that when you make an enforcement decision, whether it is to go civil or criminal or to do the
case yourself, or to bring in an outside attorney, outside agency, or
whether to go federal, the decision should be made on the facts. It
should be made on the various practicalities of how the case will be
better investigated and presented.
I do not know how much my agency has done federally in the
past. I know I've got a number of things now that are pending on
the federal level. For me, the decision is based on things like in
which jurisdiction the particular circumstances would be better
handled, whether there are more resources that can be devoted,
because by going federal you have other agencies - such as the
FBI, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and others who can be brought in.
There may be parallel jurisdiction. There may be federal offenses that are uniquely relevant to the particular facts at hand that
would not be handled effectively, if at all, if you stayed within the
41. See Gregg Birnbaum, Vacco Finally Gives Up Lost Cause, N.Y.

PosT,

Dec. 15,

1998, at 16 ("An ecstatic Eliot Spitzer yesterday geared up to take over the state's top
legal post after Attorney General Dennis Vacco gave up trying to overturn the elec-

tion results.").
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state system. There may be prior conduct of the actor that relates
somehow to that courthouse or that U.S. Attorney.
So I think that essentially, as with all prosecutive judgments, the
decision how to proceed, whether it is civil, criminal, or a combination of the two, at the same time or sequentially, or whether to go
federal or state, should be driven by the severity of the conduct,
the resources, predictability of outcome, and a balance of the various goals that you are trying to achieve.
For example, to go back to a theme of the regulator versus the
prosecuting office, in many environmental cases where there are
environmental crimes - let's say, for example, deliberate dumping, where you have evidence that someone is deliberately dumping some kind of a horrible substance into the sewer system,
something that even a traditional prosecutor would recognize as a
bad thing - there it may be clearer that you should be going criminal, both in terms of getting the appropriate punishment for the
individual, as well as for deterrent value. But there are other concerns, such as making sure you have sufficiently addressed the environmental health and safety harm associated with it.
So, among other things, if you have a situation where you believe
you are going to have to have parallel civil or administrative enforcement in order to address potential or immediate harm at a
site, it seems to me another factor that should be taken into consideration is the very practical one of how do you get along with that
office.
We have talked about a lot of the important theoretical and policy-driven kinds of things today. One of the things I do not think
we have focused on all that much is the down-to-earth question of
"Can you work together, do you cooperate, do you speak the same
language, do you respect each other, can you work as a team?"
That is certainly part of what I look for in referring cases. And
where I do not get that kind of service for my agency from the
lawyers who are supposed to represent us, I do everything I can not
to go back to that office. So that is one of my principal
considerations.
MR. CARBERRY: So you think prosecutors obviously would
want your good case and, despite the enormous collegiality between the Eastern District and the Southern District sharing one
city, that they maybe would have some jealousy over the case, and
maybe New Jersey would claim venue, and then, of course, the local offices. So, would prosecutors maybe do some of your less-important cases in trade for doing your big case?
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MS. KRIS: I think that is more likely to happen at the state level
than the federal. But I do view myself as a customer or client, in
that I think that one of the ways to get better results- and just
better work overall- is to try to establish that there is a certain
amount of sales going on here.
Whether it is qui tam lawyers who have a financial interest in
selling cases to the Department of Justice, or it is agents who are
trying to sell their criminal case, or it is an agency that has a mission to try to accomplish, we are all vying for resources. I think a
critical factor for us is to get the kind of responsiveness and respect
that we need.
MR. FISKE: I cannot let that subject go by without using it as
an opportunity to say something more about Bill Tendy. One of
the things that made Bill so extraordinarily valuable to all of the
U.S. Attorneys that he worked with was his relationship with the
law enforcement agencies. There were very few of them that, if
they had a choice to go to any different office, would not come to
Bill Tendy before they would go anywhere else.
JUDGE MARTIN: Let me just say one thing. One of the
problems I see in this is that because you are talking about agencies who can bring you the big case, I think there is a real tension in
the bringing of the cases that are big in publicity and those that are
probably more important to the community.
I have heard a lot of people in this room say that the government
today is not doing as much in the white-collar area as they did
some years ago. I do not know whether that is true, but I do know
that they are certainly doing a lot more with organized crime,
gangs, and people who are doing a lot more damage to society than
people who engage in insider trading. But I think that the problem
is that the glamour is with the big regulatory cases.
MR. CARBERRY: Or even the big organized crime cases.
John, you used the phrase "balkanization" of federal law enforcement - you have so many agencies, you have the prosecutors' offices in competing jurisdictions. We have been basically talking
about cases where the prosecutor has discretion, but there have
been occasions where basically agencies put the cases up for bid or maybe never that directly - but there is some sense that they
could move the case somewhere else, and they want something else
besides someone to service that case.
Each new U.S. Attorney inherits the majority of the criminal
cases which are responses to indictments that he cannot change.
But he or she can make a significant difference in an office's priori-
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ties, whether it is organized crime, whether it is white-collar crime,
or whether it is just responding to opportunities in any one area
and moving your resources in.
JUDGE MARTIN: I think there is even less ability to set priorities. The problem I found when I was a U.S. Attorney was there
were just so many big cases there to be done, it was getting enough
people to do them. It was very hard to say, "Gee, I think we
should look into the construction industry, and let me take four
Assistants and maybe drill a few dry holes." I mean, there was just
such a backlog of really significant cases, it was very hard to do that
type of prioritization.
MR. CARBERRY: So what do you need to do that, John? That
is a perfect example, the construction industry in New York.
JUDGE MARTIN: Ultimately, I think that when you step back,
what we bring to the table as U.S. Attorneys more than anything
else is the ability to prosecute. If you have cases ready for prosecution, you should be doing that; the agency should be out doing the
investigation.
MS. KRIS: Can I give an example? I think we have a tendency
to focus on the big case here, maybe by virtue of our backgrounds.
But a lot of what goes on in the criminal field, at the state level
anyway, is that there are large numbers of cases that get brought
and no one sees them, no one pays attention to them, and they may
or may not ultimately have the effect that they are supposed to
have, because they never get seen as particularly serious.
As an example, I have uniformed officers who work for me, and
one of the things they do is they go out and they catch people who
are clamming. There are places in New York City where you are
not allowed to clam because the water is contaminated. There are
people that go out clamming at night, and then they tag the clams
as if were coming from Long Island, which is clean, when in fact
they are coming from Jamaica Bay. They end up at the Fulton Fish
Market.
We do hundreds of these cases. They are hard cases to make.
The officers have to work in the middle of the night to catch these
people. They engage in high-speed chases. I am not kidding.
MR. CARBERRY: I didn't think clams were that quick.
MS. KRIS: They end up catching them because the boat crashes.
But this type of case is one of several. Let's say these officers bring
2,000 cases a year. They go to criminal court. I may not even know
about it. No lawyer in my office works on it.
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In certain of the criminal courts the judges know them, know
what they do, have developed an appreciation for the work and the
importance of the cases. But in Manhattan, for example, they will
not even let them come into court because they do not view any of
this as criminal.
And so, one of the things about the system is that every now and
then, when you have a case that really has some profile to it, it
creates an opportunity to tell the world about something that is
going on that is really a bad practice and that you have not been
able to make a dent in at all, despite hundreds and hundreds of
cases and fines and other kinds of penalties.
Thus, one of the things that I look at is evaluating the enforcement techniques we have used before'- are we getting the results
we want to get; and, if we are not, what should we be doing
differently?
The converse of that is these officers who bring these cases, if
they go to court, the case is over in no time. If they go civilly, with
the legal staff that I have - we've got a docket of thousands of
cases and only four lawyers - they may write up this case and no
one even looks at it for five years.
The other part of this is to constantly fight against the tendency
to use the criminal process because it is easier, because somebody
will plead guilty and take a $500 criminal fine, and they will get a
result.
So, I guess, it all again comes down to checks and balances and
building up an appreciation for what it is you are trying to do, and
having an advocate, whether it is the judge in the criminal court, a
sympathetic D.A. or a prosecutor who recognizes the importance
of the matter and will proceed aggressively where the facts warrant
it.

MS. SPEARING: Mary Ellen just ensured that the only thing
people will remember from this panel is don't eat the clams.
PROF. NOBLE: I just want to add - either to join everyone
else or to sort of dissent from the view of this panel, if the view is
that civil enforcement mechanisms cannot act as a very, very significant deterrence to criminal conduct - I just know, from my experience as a prosecutor, many times I had no difficulty getting
someone to plead to five, six, or seven tax counts, but the pleas
often stood or fell on the question of what the civil tax penalty
would be following the plea, whether or not there would be civil
debarment.
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Or if we look in New York City, just look at the success Mayor
Giuliani has had with the waste-hauling industry.42 Right now, the
regulatory scheme is a significant civil regulatory scheme augmented by criminal prosecutions. But the kind of investigative
work that this City has done with regard to these contractors has
improved the waste-hauling industry. If you want to engage in possibly criminal conduct and you are dirty, you are going to have a
much more difficult time engaging in it now than you did before.
Certainly, the civil enforcement scheme can complement a criminal enforcement scheme - and I defer to Bob Fiske on individual
cases. If you have both, you might prefer criminal, but I do believe
that a civil enforcement scheme can work.
MR. CARBERRY: I thank the panelists and thank you.

42. See Selwyn Raab, Trash Haulers Told: No Mobsters or Odors, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 1996, at 43 (reporting that twelve regulations, most aimed at reforming New
York City's mobster-scarred private garbage-hauling industry and lowering fees,
would be imposed by a new city agency).
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